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Abstract
The severe anti-female bias in natality and child mortality that gives rise to In-
dia’s missing women has been widely documented and various explanations ranging
from agricultural labor demand to dowries have been oﬀered in the literature. In
general, the low demand for girls has been interpreted as a rational response to
economic constraints. This paper shows the importance of culture both in deter-
mining the value of girls and in shaping parental economic constraints. We ﬁnd that
conservative cultural attitudes, proxied by the electoral success of religious parties,
is positively correlated with anti-female bias. Moreover, higher household expendi-
ture is negatively correlated with the number of girls. This suggests that we cannot
rely on rising income levels, brought about by economic growth, to improve the
demographic disadvantage faced by Indian women. Our policy recommendations
therefore focus on changing attitudes of son-preference that motivate anti-female
bias as much as enforcement of gender-equality legislation.
JEL Codes: J11, J16, O12
Keywords: Female Disadvantage, Mortality, Son Preference, India
1 Introduction
The observation that certain regions in South and East Asia exhibit both sex ratios
at birth and child survival rates that are highly skewed towards boys is certainly
not new. In fact, over a decade ago Amartya Sen calculated that a staggering
100 million females are missing in the region (Sen 1992), and countless articles
before and since then have created an often heated debate about the causes and
consequences and even the number of these missing women. In this article we
examine sex ratios in India at birth and for all surviving children under ﬁve. Two
of our ﬁndings are particularly important. First, while economic factors clearly
∗We would like to thank Pravin Trivedi and Gerhard Glomm as well as the participants at the Indiana
University Brown Bag Seminar Series for their valuable comments. As always, all remaining errors are
ours.
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1aﬀect the number of girls born and surviving, it is not the case that higher income
leads to more girls. Using a quantile estimation procedure we ﬁnd that expenditure
has a particularly large negative eﬀect on lower quantiles of the child sex-ratio
distribution. In as far as girls are perceived to be more expensive by parents than
boys, the increasing availability of pre-natal sex screening and sex-selective abortions
accompanying growing income appears to dominate possible income constraints to
raising girls. Partly in consequence we contend that cultural factors are driving
sex-ratios in India.
While cultural values are hard if not impossible to observe in census data, we
ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant negative correlation between the number of girls born
and the share of votes won by religious parties in a given district. This result should
not be misconstrued as a claim of responsibility. Rather we argue that both voting
for certain religious parties and a pronounced son preference are expressions of a
particular conservative cultural mindset. Unless this mindset is changed, economic
development might not lead to more balanced sex ratios.
India is interesting for several reasons. First, despite widespread improvements
in the access to healthcare and nutrition, the relative number of girls under ﬁve has
actually fallen over the last ten years from 955 for every 1000 boys in 1991 to 930
in 2001.1 Sen (2003) credits the increase in availability of pre-natal sex screening
technology and sex-selective abortions for this development. Moreover, sex-ratios
exhibit stark inter-regional heterogeneity. Compared to an approximate reference
US sex ratio at birth of 0.95, for example, 2001 state-level rates vary from 0.78 and
0.79 in Haryana and Punjab, respectively, to 1.00 and 0.99 in Arunachal Pradesh
and Mizoram.2 The map in ﬁgure 1 reveals a striking geographic pattern with the
lowest number of girls born in the North-Western parts of India. This development
is problematic as the shortage of women for marriage does not seem to have led to
a general rise in their bargaining power both before and after marriage, contrary
to what might be expected. Rather, the severe lack of women in certain regions of
India seems to have resulted in increased trade in “brides” between states, forced
prostitution and sexual abuse of women and children.3
A wide range of explanations have been oﬀered for the lack of girls. Drew et al.
(1986) and Oster (2005b), for example, point to ﬁndings from the medical literature
which suggest that women infected with the Hepatitis B virus tend to give birth
to fewer girls than healthy women, with the latter attributing up to 20% of India’s
missing girls to the virus. Given the prevalence and distribution of Hepatitis B in
India (Pulliyel 2006) we believe that Oster (2005b) overestimates the importance
of this natural cause for sex determination.4 The lack of comprehensive data for
India, however, makes any empirical anlysis unreliable at best and a calculation
of missing women due to the virus impossible for all intents and purposes. At
any rate, even assuming that Oster (2005b)’s numbers are correct, Hepatitis B can
1See table 1.
2Figures for all Indian states are found in table 2. The international comparison is provided in table
3.
3BBC World News, 5 April 2006.
4The argument rests on two observations. First, the Hepatitis B prevalence used by Oster (2005b)
(4.33%) considerably exceeds the estimates obtained from a meta-analysis for non-tribal women (2.1%-
1.5%) (Pulliyel 2006). Moreover, the particularly hight infection rates associated with both tribal pop-
ulations (19.7%) and particular states (Tamil Nadu, 4.4% and Karnataka, 4.5%) are at odds with the
relatively high sex ratios among those populations. A more general critique of Oster (2005b)’s thesis
and her reply can be found in the exchange in the Population and Development Review (Das Gupta
2005, Oster 2006, Das Gupta 2006).
2account for at most one ﬁfth of the anti-female bias. An additional 20% to 50%
may be explained by discriminatory access to health services and nutrition (Oster
2005a). The question is then why girls are receiving less health care and food, and,
furthermore, why this disadvantage seems to be almost exclusive to certain regions.
Economic arguments focus on the cost and beneﬁt of raising boys and girls. Since
women traditionally become part of their husband’s extended family and are not
expected to contribute to the ﬁnancial support of their parents in old age, having
sons has a positive eﬀect on the expected standard of living of parents. This eﬀect
is less severe in regions where people practice village-level endogamy, that is where
marriages tend to take place within a village, and daughters remain physically close
to their parents (Agnihotri 1996, Kishor 1993, Dyson & Moore 1983). A similar
point is made by Lahiri & Self (2004, 2005) who observe that endogamous practices
in Southern India and even more so among the Muslim community can explain at
least part of the diﬀerential sex ratios.
Dowry imposes a second direct and signiﬁcant cost on the bride’s parents. Al-
though illegal, there is suﬃcient anecdotal evidence to support the conclusion that
dowry payments are not only still demanded but that they often represent a severe
ﬁnancial burden for the household of the bride (Greenberg 2003). Regional diﬀer-
ences in marriage practices and an increase in real dowry payments over the last
decades may then be at least partly responsible for the observed sex ratios. While
there is no comprehensive study of dowry payments, with the partial exception of
Rao (1994), there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that dowry payments are sub-
stantial and that demands may have risen over the last decade or so. Amounts
in the order of Rs. 1m (US$ 21,834)5 for upper middle class marriages are not
uncommon and even low-income men, such as teachers or clerks, can command as
much as Rs. 300,000 (US$ 6,550). Non-resident Indian men, who often come with
US permanent residence, have prices between Rs. 5m (US$ 109,170) and Rs. 200m
(US$ 4,366,812).6 Compared to a median monthly per capita and overall household
expenditure of Rs. 140 and Rs. 843, respectively, (US$ 3.05 and US$ 18.40), such
amounts are staggering and may provide suﬃcient incentives to prefer boys.7
Bardhan (1974, 1988) links the relatively low female birth and survival rates in
the Northwest of India to agricultural practice. He observes that farmers in the
regions with the lowest sex ratios grow mainly wheat and other cereals while the
dominant crop in the Southern parts of India tends to be rice. If growing wheat
is more male labor intensive than growing rice, perhaps due to the tasks involved,
agricultural cultivation patterns could explain diﬀerential son preference across In-
dia. While this is a plausible explanation, it is not obvious that diﬀerent crops have
diﬀerent sex-speciﬁc labor requirements and evidence from wheat-growing regions
in Africa does not seem to support this argument. In any case, agricultural labor
demand should not aﬀect urban households, providing an empirical test for the
hypothesis.
With rising per capita income in India it might be expected that economic con-
straints become less powerful and the relative number of girls increase over time.
After all, richer parents do not have to rely solely on their sons for their survival
in old age and – unless the income elasticities of dowry payments and wedding ex-
penses exceed one – the relative price of girls should therefore fall. In addition,
5An exchange rate of Rs. 45.80/US$ is used for all currency conversions.
6Source: Sunday Times of India, Mumbai Edition, December 11, 2005.
7These ﬁgures represent the median monthly expenditure using data for 593,989 individuals in 119,126
households (Consumer Expenditure Schedule, NSSO, 1999-2000).
3improving job opportunities for women may give them the resources to contribute
to the ﬁnancial support of their parents. The fact that sex-ratios have been falling
as aggregate income has been rising seems thus at ﬁrst inconsistent with a purely
economic view of missing women. The availability of sex-selective abortion, how-
ever, complicates the picture. If the cost of aborting a daughter is lower than the
cost of raising a girl, a slight increase in income might allow parents the choice to
abort their daughter without, however, giving them the ﬁnancial freedom to raise
a girl. Although sex-selective abortions, like dowry demands, are illegal, (anecdo-
tal) evidence suggests that they are well within the means of middle-class parents.8
A price range from Rs. 5,000 (US$ 109) to Rs. 20,000 (US$ 437) for illegal sex-
selective abortions reported by the Indian news media9 is consistent with the ﬁnding
of several studies that legal early abortions are available for between Rs. 500 and
Rs. 1,000 and late abortions average between Rs. 2,000 and Rs. 3,000 per case (see
table 4) (Duggal 2004, Ganatra et al. 2001, Barge et al. 2004, Ramanathan et al.
2003, George et al. 2003, Centre for Operations Research and Training 1997, Parivar
Seva Sanstha 2002). The relationship between average income and sex ratios is then
unlikely to be linear and might include signiﬁcant threshold eﬀects.
In this paper we propose that economic constraints are often the consequence of
cultural perceptions. Both dowry payments and support in old age are negotiated
in a socio-cultural context and it might be argued that even the division of the ma-
jority of agricultural tasks is determined more by conventions than actual physical
requirements. This argument is not new. Das Gupta (1987)’s detailed study of
fertility and natality in Northern India ﬁnds that cultural variables constrain the
role of women in such ways that they are an economic burden to their parents. The
missing women are thus only a part of a more general framework of gender interac-
tions in which culture and economics are inextricably linked. While these economic
aspects of gender work through the parental budget constraints, non-economic fac-
tors might also be present in the utility function. Quite simply having a son might
– at least ex ante – be more satisfying for parents. This is not to say that purely
economic reasons are not fundamental determinants of sex ratios. Our conjecture
is that the severity of economic constraints is to some extent determined by cul-
tural variables and that, potentially, cultural traditions aﬀect parents preferences
diﬀerentially throughout India.
The paper proceeds as follows. The following section discusses brieﬂy the socio-
economic aspects of gender selection and establishes a link between conservative
culture and son preferences. Since attitudes are diﬃcult if not impossible to extract
from census data, we argue that voting behavior may be used as a proxy. Section 3
describes the data sources. The empirical analysis and a discussion of the results is
found in section 4.
8The Indian government legalized abortion under the Medical Termination of Pregnancy (MTP) Act,
1971 (amended in 2002). This law gives Indian women the right to terminate an unintended pregnancy
by a registered medical practitioner in a hospital established or maintained by the Government or a
place approved for the purpose of this Act by the Government. Pregnancies can be terminated for three
reasons: as a health measure when there is danger to the life or risk to physical or mental health of
the women; on humanitarian grounds (such as when pregnancy arises from a sex crime like rape); and
where there is a substantial risk that the child, if born, would suﬀer from deformities and diseases. The
Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act and Rules 1994
(as amended up to 2002) (PCPNDT Act) mandates that sex selection by any person, by any means,
before or after conception, is prohibited.
9Sources: Daily Mail, online edition, July 4, 2006; Times of India, online edition, August 17, 2006.
42 Sex-selection, culture and voting behavior
Culture can aﬀect the worth – both economic and non-economic – of girls in many
often subtle ways. Instrumental in this respect are gender relations within the In-
dian extended family system that are traditionally characterized by fundamental
asymmetries. A lexicographic power structure with respect to sex and age underlies
most intra-household transactions and decisions, with wives and daughters expected
to obey decisions taken by male household members (Kandiyoti 1988). Moreover,
the importance of the family lineage and reputation aﬀect men and women diﬀer-
ently. While this does not apply to modern Westernized families, we will argue
below that it may represent an ideal for some conservative Hindu households.
In this idealized setting, sons bring new (subordinate) members to a household
while daughters, who join their husband’s family, are lost to their parents. This
has economic consequences in as far as household heads are able to command the
economic resources of its female members (including dowry payments) and it has
consequences for the distribution of power within families. Since the new wives as
young women occupy the lowest level of the hierarchy on top of being outsiders they
increase the power of more senior female household members. The mistreatment of
new wives at the hands of their mother in law, a common theme in many Bollywood
movies and a reality for many women (Greenberg 2003), is an expression of this
power structure. The tighter the control of male over female family members and
the larger the physical distance between wives and their parents the larger one
would expect the diﬀerence in worth between sons and daughters to be.10 Part of
this asymmetry translates into the value of mothers in a way that even in families
where ﬁnancial constraints might be secondary women giving birth to sons are held
in higher regard than mothers of daughters.
Traditional ideas of honor and the importance of maintaining a honorable family
reputation exacerbate the situation. At the center of this lies a deﬁnition of female
moral integrity that views with outright hostility any contact between women and
unrelated men and a type of spillover in which the actions of a particular family
member aﬀect the honor of the entire family. This is both the consequence of
a traditional female ideal which values modesty and shamefulness above all and
an issue of control. Unsupervised contact between men and women of diﬀerent
households signals a lack of control of the household over its female members. In
that sense, women requiring permission to leave the house, even if granted, is a sign
of control well exercised (Derne 1994).
This has two economic consequences. Since female employment involves contact
between men and women that can under most circumstances not be controlled
and supervised by male family members, female wage rates are unlikely to aﬀect
employment by women in traditional households. If the work of female household
members can be organized in a way that does not represent a potential threat to the
family honor, say by mutual supervision of female household members, women are
more likely to be economically valuable. Communal agricultural work, for example,
may be one of those instances.
Moreover, in a society where informal transactions are key to economic success,
a loss of honor due to the behavior of a female family member may well have serious
material consequences on top of bringing shame to the family. While this is certainly
true for wives, its also holds for daughters. Girls are therefore much more of a risk
10Access to communications technology may reduce the impact of physical distance for some women,
but seems unlikely to be able to replace physical presence.
5to family honor than sons to whom the strict moral code does not generally apply.
The dowry situation has to be seen in this context of honor and expected female
behavior. Firstly, the payment of a dowry is likely to be more acceptable to tradi-
tional parents both because it is seen as the norm and because dowry negotiations
can easily be included in the prenuptial contract of an arranged marriage. More
modern ideas of courtship and dating, which would violate the honor of a conser-
vative family, are less amenable to dowry demands although, of course, there are
exceptions. Fernandez et al. (2002)’s argument that, at least in the US and with
respect to education, men are marrying women that resemble their mothers is likely
to apply in this context, too. Women from Westernized families would be more
likely to marry men from similar family backgrounds and dowry might not be part
of the wedding arrangements. Moreover, the loss of face associated with a canceled
wedding, that is with a rejected daughter, may make households embedded in a
traditional cultural setting more susceptible to dowry blackmail.11
Within India, this type of family structure and value system is by no means
universal. Rather it should be seen as a high-caste ideal associated with conservative
Aryan (Hindu) ideology. Southern Indian Dravidian cultural norms as well as family
organization in non-Hindu religions and even lower caste Hindu ideals and practices
are likely to be diﬀerent (Derne 1994). What this implies, however, is that one might
expect lower sex ratios in families that have adopted more closely the traditional
high caste family values described above, either because of the ﬁnancial implications
or due to the underlying value system. The North-South divide in sex ratios widely
accepted in the literature could thus be an outcome of cultural diﬀerences.
Unfortunately, parental preferences and the process of cultural determination of
the costs and beneﬁts of girls relative to boys are impossible to observe directly.
Variables such as female labor force participation and wages or education, which
have been used in previous studies, are only imperfect proxies. While they do reﬂect
cultural aspects to some extent, they are also aﬀected by purely economic deter-
minants and it is in general diﬃcult if not impossible to disentangle the two. The
endogeneity of wages and the link between education, labor force participation and
expected remuneration complicate the empirical analysis. Any attempt to isolate
the cultural determinants of sex-preferences, whether they operate through eco-
nomic channels or aﬀect preferences directly, therefore requires a measure of culture
that is not directly aﬀected by economics. As such measures of culture are hard to
ﬁnd in published data, we attempt to proxy cultural attitudes by voting behavior.
More precisely we assume that a traditional cultural mind-set which leads to both
higher costs of raising girls and a possible anti-female bias in preferences makes
voting for particular religious parties more likely.
2.1 Political parties and the sex ratio
Associating particular political parties with low sex ratios is without doubt con-
troversial and one has to point out, therefore, that our argument does not imply
that the parties in question actively discriminate against women or are in any way
directly responsible for sex-selection. Furthermore, this should not be misconstrued
as a statement about all religious parties without qualiﬁcation. Nevertheless, we be-
lieve that there exists a link between anti-female bias and an ideological proximity to
the Sangh Parivar (SP), literally a “family organization” of political parties, social
11A girl that has been linked to a particular man through an engagement or in any other way is seen
as less desirable and therefore less likely to ﬁnd a husband in the future.
6institutions and paramilitary forces aﬃliated with the Hindu nationalist Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).12
Despite the often cited requirement that funerary rites should be performed by a
son, this bias does not automatically come out of Hindu religious doctrine. Rather,
gender relations in the SP are shaped by a particular nationalist agenda (Hindutva)
that frames the current environment in terms of the defense of Hindu India against
Muslim aggression (Sarkar 1989). Based on a particular interpretation of high-caste
Hindu norms and combined with a strong anti-Muslim rhetoric, that is occasionally
backed up by violent action, men are seen as the dominant force in gender relations
with the male Hindu warrior image featuring strongly in the ideology (Banerjee
2003) .
The role of women is more complex. On an abstract level, the body of a woman
represents the Hindu motherland that is in danger of being violated by Muslim
invaders as well as the purity of Hindu tradition unsullied by contact with Western
ideas (Banerjee 2003). On a more physical level, Bacchetta (2004) observes that
women are often described in their role as mothers and sisters and therefore as
asexual beings in the oﬃcial RSS propaganda. By denying their sexuality and
describing them purely in terms of their relationship to men – mothers and sisters,
not wives – women are essentially devoid of independent desires and personality.
This is reﬂected in the oﬃcial line on married life disseminated through seminars and
literature for RSS members. Girls are supposed to acquiesce to the parental selection
of a groom and self-choice is strongly discouraged (Sarkar 1989). The tradition of the
docile, defenseless wife is stressed. Rather than stand up for themselves, women are
supposed to obey and support their husbands and blame themselves for any marital
diﬃculties (Sarkar 1989, Banerjee 2003). Male behavior, including inﬁdelity, on the
other hand, is often excused by pointing to biological diﬀerences both in the RSS
(Banerjee 2003) and in society more generally (Pintchman 2004). These ideas and
behavior tend to diminish the value and status of women in the social, religious, as
well as economic spheres in India.
In order to test our hypothesis of a culturally determined sex-bias we therefore
take voting for religious parties into account.13 The parties associated with the
RSS are dominated by the nationally-operating Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and
include several local parties such as the Maharashtran Shiv Sena. Although we
do not possess any information on the gender attitudes of the Muslim League we
include its vote share to allow for a possible connection between sex preferences and
voting behavior for Muslims. Since there is no explicitly Christian political party we
cannot use vote shares as proxies for conservative Christian values. The Shiromani
Akali Dal, an exclusively Sikh party, has been excluded from the analysis since its
electoral success is almost perfectly correlated with the share of the Sikh population
in a district (ρ = 0.97).
Voting behavior is certainly not determined solely by cultural attitudes; and
the electoral success of the BJP and its allies in the 1990s can to a large extent
be attributed to disillusionment with the performance of the Congress Party led
government. Time-series of election results are thus probably not good indicators
of changes in cultural attitudes. Inter-regional diﬀerences in voting behavior, while
reﬂecting local political and economic particularities, on the other hand, might be
more indicative of underlying cultural diﬀerences. To be sure, not everyone who
12This link was ﬁrst made by Sen (2003) who observed a geographic coincidence of low sex ratios and
popularity of religious parties in the North-West of India.
13For a list of the relevant parties, please see table 6.
7votes for a religious party is conservative in our sense, but conservative people are
more likely to vote for religious (nationalist) parties ceteris paribus.14
3 The Data
The data used in the empirical analysis is compiled from three sources. Since we are
interested in voting behavior which is not observable at the level of individual house-
holds we are restricted to using data collected at the district level, the highest level
of disaggregation at which we can match election results, socio-economic variables
and sex ratios. Including all Indian states and union territories15, we obtain data
for 569 districts. With two exceptions, all dependent and explanatory variables are
from the 2001 Census of India, which is originally available at the district level.16
District-level measures of income and wealth are calculated from the 55th round
of the Consumer Expenditure Schedule of the National Sample Survey Organization,
administered during 1999 and 2000. In particular we use the natural logarithm of
the median per capita household expenditure in a district to capture the purchasing
power in a particular district.17
Voting behavior is obtained from electoral data for State Legislative Assemblies
published by the Election Commission of India. State Legislative Assemblies are
directly elected bodies set up to carry out the administration of the government in
India’s states and union territories. The choice of elections for state-level institutions
instead of national elections does not imply that we view these as more appropriate
proxies for cultural traditions. Rather, national parliamentary constituencies are
larger than state assembly constituencies and often straddle districts, making it
diﬃcult to match election results to district-level socio-economic data. Since each
district has between 1 and 37 representatives in the State Legislative Assembly
and consists of the same number of assembly constituencies aggregation of election
results is much easier.
Using election data from the election year immediately preceding 2001 in each
state we ﬁrst constructed a mapping of assembly constituencies into districts using
various constituency delimitation orders as well as listings of constituencies included
in each district from Bose & Singh (1988a,b,c, 2000a,b). Religious parties were iden-
tiﬁed from the list of parties registered with the Election Commission of India using
their political manifestos, often posted on the internet, news media and political al-
liances. A list of religious parties representing nationalistic Hindu, Sikh and Muslim
groups can be found in Table 6.
4 Results and discussion
The parameters estimated are obtained from a log linear regression model for the
ratio of girls to boys both at birth and between ages zero to ﬁve. While the latter
speciﬁcation has been used extensively in the literature on female disadvantage,
birth and child ratios measure slightly diﬀerent aspects of gender preferences. Ab-
stracting from natural medical causes for a low sex-ratio, it can be argued that
14We have no proof for this assertion as exit polls are to our knowledge not conducted in India and
individual voting behavior cannot be statistically linked to personal traits. We believe, however, that
the rhetoric of political programs addresses certain parts of the population more directly than others.
15Administrative units that do not have state status.
16A description of the explanatory variables can be found in table 7.
17Alternative measures of expenditure and their eﬀect on the results are described in section 4.1.
8birth numbers are a more direct measure of sex preferences since survival rates are
aﬀected by diﬀerential susceptibility to post-natal and childhood diseases and the
quality of the health care system. An opposite argument may be made equally con-
vincingly: since the majority of Indian households do not have access to pre-natal
sex-selection technology, neglect after birth and unequal access to healthcare might
make the number of surviving children more representative of the desired ratio.18
As we cannot claim to be able to determine which speciﬁcation is more appropriate,
we report the results of both speciﬁcations.
Estimation is both by Ordinary Least Squares and Koenker & Basset Jr. (1978)’s
quantile regression model. In contrast to OLS which estimates the conditional mean
of the distribution of sex ratios, a quantile regression describes a particular quantile
of the distribution conditional on the observed covariates. It is thus possible to
examine the eﬀect of the exogenous variables on various parts of the distribution.
We estimate the regression quantiles in 5% intervals and obtain standard errors
by bootstrapping with 1000 repetitions (Koenker & Hallock 2001). Testing for
parameter constancy across quantiles we cannot reject homoscedasticity at the 5%
conﬁdence level for all explanatory variables except expenditure in the child sex-
ratio model speciﬁcation. Moreover, with the previously mentioned exception none
of the coeﬃcients of the median regression are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from their
OLS counterparts at 5% conﬁdence levels, suggesting that the OLS results are not
signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by outliers. We therefore only reprt the results of the OLS
regressions (tables 8 and 9).
The ﬁrst interesting ﬁnding is the negative, statistically signiﬁcant, OLS coeﬃ-
cient for the median monthly per capita household expenditure variable: the higher
the expenditure level of the median household in a district, the lower the sex ratio.
Few authors have included explicit expenditure variables in their model and this
negative correlation comes as somewhat of a surprise. Moreover, the negative eﬀect
of income on the sex ratios of children under ﬁve is most severe in the left part of the
distribution, whereas sex ratios above the 8th decile are not signiﬁcantly correlated
with expenditure at a 10% signiﬁcance level.19 An increase in the median household
expenditure thus leads to an increas in the dispersion of sex ratios: districts that
have lower sex ratios than expected given their covariates experience the largest
reduction in sex ratios as income increases. On the other hand, expenditure has no
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect in districts where anti-female discrimination is inex-
plicably low. This does not hold for birth ratios where we cannot reject coeﬃcient
constancy over the range of quantiles.
The relaxation of income constraints discriminating against more expensive girls
might have been expected to increase the relative number of girls born and raised.
As pointed out above, however, at very low expenditure levels rising income may
make sex selection aﬀordable without giving households the resources to raise girls:
abortion costs can be as low as a few hundred rupees whereas dowries are substan-
tially higher. With an average median district expenditure of Rs. 149 (US$ 3.25)
per capita and month and a minimum and maximum of only Rs. 42 (US$ 0.92)
and Rs. 539 (US$ 11.77)20, respectively, this hypothesis does not seem unreason-
able. The possible alternative, that dowries have an income elasticity exceeding
18Anecdotal evidence about mobile ultrasound units touring the countryside, operated by enterprising
individuals, suggests that sex determination at least is becoming more widely available.
19See ﬁgure 2.
20The average exchange rate of Rs. 45.8/US$ was used for the conversion. These ﬁgures represent
the average, minimum, and maximum of the median monthly per capita household expenditure among
all 569 Indian districts.
9one, would also be compatible with this result. Neither of these eﬀects would be as
severe in districts with high sex ratios
To examine the role of expenditure, that is of a combination of wealth and
income, in more detail, we re-estimate the model with expenditure broken down
by various percentiles (table 10). The results show that the negative correlation
between expenditure and sex ratios is concentrated at the bottom half of the dis-
tribution, supporting our contention that the relationship is mainly caused by a
relaxation of the budget constraint of the poor. An increase in wealth from very
low levels makes sex-selection aﬀordable; at higher wealth levels the constraint was
not binding to begin with.
Irrespective of which explanation is the correct one, this ﬁnding has profound
consequences. Ceteris paribus, as income and wealth levels rise with economic
growth, one might expect the relative number of girls to fall for potentially a con-
siderable period of time. Relying on economic growth alone as a solution to the
missing women problem might thus turn out to be the wrong policy, and one that
might lead to signiﬁcant social upheaval as consecutive generations of men cannot
ﬁnd marriage partners. Due to asymmetric power structures in India, where men
are traditionally in a dominant position, the relative scarcity of women is unlikely
to lead to an improved bargaining position. Rather, it is more likely that the value,
status, and rights of women might in fact deteriorate. “Bride abductions”, wife
sharing, forced prostitution and rape are likely consequences, unless existing laws
are eﬀectively enforced or the asymmetries are corrected.
A higher proportion of male workers increases the relative number of girls. In as
much as higher male labor force participation leads to higher income and expendi-
ture this result seems counter-intuitive given the negative eﬀect of median household
expenditure. While it is tempting to explain this result by a possible multicollinear-
ity between expenditure and labor force participation, the relatively low correlation
between median household expenditure and male workforce participation (ρ = 0.20)
suggests that other factors may be important. Men who spend a signiﬁcant portion
of their time at work may have less control over reproductive decisions. If women
then exhibit less anti-female bias than men, a contention that we do not necessarily
espouse, higher sex ratios may be the result.
Female labor force participation in contrast has no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect
on sex ratios. This may be true for two reasons. First, households who contemplate
sex selection might be qualitatively diﬀerent from households where women con-
sider working, due perhaps to a cultural reluctance to allow women to go to work.
An increase in female employment opportunities would then be irrelevant to the
sex selection decision. Alternatively, women’s earning potential does not enter the
decision about whether to have girls or not, either because of cognitive limitations
or because it does not aﬀect dowries and support in old age. The low female labor
force participation rate of on average 28% seems to support the ﬁrst conclusion.
The statistical insigniﬁcance of the proportion of literate women, that is of the
number of women who have at least low levels of education, in both birth and
child sex ratios is surprising, but has been observed by Das Gupta (1987) amongst
others. A higher number of literate girls and women has often been interpreted as a
sign of higher value for females, and therefore should be expected to be negatively
correlated with discrimination against girls. This argument does not take the timing
of events into account, however. It is well possible that ex ante parents prefer not to
have a daughter, but once the daughter is born their optimal strategy is to provide
at least some education for her in order to minimize their economic loss. If education
is reasonably cheap, for example, and men desire educated wives in order to raise
10their own children, literacy might reduce dowry payments by enough to make it a
worthwhile investment for parents of girls. In any case, the link between primary
education and the ‘value of women’ is weak.
In a second argument, educated women are expected to be less culturally con-
servative as education is assumed to remove girls from their traditional environment
and imbue them with more modern ideas. More modern women are then seen as
having less of an anti-female bias, contradicting our regression result. In a cultural
setting where women ﬁnd themselves in a subordinate position, however, the values
of women might not matter suﬃciently to overcome traditions such as dowry and
inability of daughters to provide for their parents in old age. Nonetheless, educa-
tion aﬀects child bearing behavior with higher levels of education leading to lower
fertility. Das Gupta (1987) points out that this might have negative consequences
for the sex ratio. Since parents require a certain number of sons to secure their
survival in old age and, in a rural setting, work the family land, a reduction in the
total number of children will lead to more anti-female bias as long as the desired
number of sons is larger than half the planned number of children. In addition,
literate women might ﬁnd it easier to obtain information about sex-determination
and abortion.
Our ﬁnding suggests that none of these arguments are globally signiﬁcant. In
diﬀerent households literacy might aﬀect anti-female bias in diﬀerent ways, but no
overall valid argument can be supported statistically. Alternatively, asymmetries
between male and female household members might render very low levels of edu-
cation, measured by literacy rates, ineﬀectual for changing behavior.
The evidence that agricultural reasons make having girls less desirable is fairly
strong. Looking at birth ratios, districts with a higher proportion of male and
female cultivators, that is men and women who work their own or rented land, have
a signiﬁcantly lower proportion of girls. This is consistent with the hypothesis that
boys are more valuable as future agricultural labor force. Once political variables
are included, however, the proportion of male cultivators does no longer signiﬁcantly
aﬀect sex ratios. A similar picture emerges from the analysis of child sex ratios. A
higher share of male cultivators is correlated with lower sex ratios as long as vote
shares are not included. This suggests a possible correlation between the vote share
of Hindu political parties and the number of cultivators and makes it impossible
to claim with certainty that agricultural labor demand drives sex-discrimination in
households that work their own land. In contrast to the birth rates model, female
cultivators are not statistically signiﬁcant when sex rates for children under ﬁve are
examined.
The eﬀect of the share of male agricultural laborers is unambiguously and statis-
tically signiﬁcantly negative in all model speciﬁcations. Female agricultural workers,
on the other hand, do not inﬂuence sex ratios at birth and are positively correlated
with sex ratios of children under ﬁve. If parents are contemplating future employ-
ment opportunities for their children, a larger labor market for women in agriculture
might increase the value of girls and lead to less anti-female bias. The lack of dif-
ference between more urban and rural districts complicates the matter. Since more
urban districts are likely to contain less households engaged in farming, agricultural
labor shares might be picking up more general unobserved rural-urban diﬀerences
in behavior.
Apparently non-economic variables are undeniably highly signiﬁcant, both sta-
tistically and in terms of the magnitude of their eﬀects. The religious makeup of a
particular district, for example, has a signiﬁcant eﬀect in all model speciﬁcations.
Care has to be taken, however, in interpreting the coeﬃcients. Since the independent
11variable is the proportion of people in a given district identifying with a particular
religion, the coeﬃcients do not determine sex-ratio diﬀerentials between religious
communities. Rather they have to be interpreted as the percentage change in the
sex ratio related to an increase in the demographic representation of a particular
religious group. The proportion of Hindus has been omitted for two reasons. First,
with around 76% of the population, Hindus represent the majority of Indians and are
therefore a convenient base for comparison. Moreover, since religious classiﬁcation
in the survey is exhaustive, the relative size of the diﬀerent religious communities
is necessarily highly correlated. An increase in the proportion of one religion is
accompanied by a decrease in another. Unlike in the case of binary independent
variables, the magnitude of the coeﬃcients for each of the religious communities
thus does not directly represent inter-religious diﬀerences in sex ratios.
Examining the correlation between the relative sizes of the diﬀerent religions
in a district, one ﬁnds that the correlations between the share of Hindus and any
other religion far exceed all other correlations. In other words, the expansion of
a particular religious group most likely leads to a reduction in the proportion of
Hindus. With the share of Hindus in a particular district omitted from the regression
equation, the coeﬃcients of the other religious groups can then be interpreted as
approximately representing diﬀerences in sex ratios compared to the average Hindu
population. The emphasis here is on “approximately” as the correlations are not
perfect.
Bearing this in mind, we cannot reject the hypothesis that a higher proportion of
Muslim families leads to less skewed sex ratios despite the popular stereotypes about
Muslims and their attitude towards women. Compared to Hindus, Muslims appear
to perform less sex-selective abortions and do not discriminate as much against girls
– at least with respect to their survival chances. This may be related to the fact
that unlike all other religions in India, Muslims do not pay dowries. Instead, the
bride receives a “bride price” from the family of the groom. Moreover, according to
Hussain & Billtes (2000), 22% of marriages between Muslims are consanguineous,
with ﬁrst cousins being the preferred marriage partners. Almost one quarter of
Muslim girls therefore remain part of their parents’ extended family and can most
likely help their parents in old age. Daughters are thus, if anything, less expensive.
The results for other religions is mixed. While an increase in the proportion
of Christians reduces anti-female bias both at and after birth if the vote share of
political parties is not included, we cannot reject that they do not have a positive
eﬀect on the sex ratio once voting is accounted for. Voting behavior is crucial
in explaining this result. As it is highly unlikely that Christians would vote for
Hindu religious parties, an increase in the population share of Christians, through
the accompanying decrease in the relative number of Hindus, is correlated with a
decrease in the vote share for the BJP and its allies. The coeﬃcient of the proportion
of Christians picks up this correlation unless vote shares are explicitly accounted for.
In consequence we can claim with some conﬁdence that the sex ratios for Hindus
and Christians do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly.
The share of Buddhists has no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect. Both an increase in
the Sikh and the Jain population lead to a reduction of the number of girls relative
to boys born and in the age group between zero and ﬁve years. The magnitude of
the eﬀect for Jains is particularly striking as it seems at odds with their aversion
to killing even animals. Nonetheless, we are not aware of any research dealing with
sex-selection or gender relations among Jains and cannot oﬀer any explanation.
The low sex ratios for Sikhs is surprising and expected at the same time. While
the oﬃcial religious doctrine stresses gender equality and explicitly discourages
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part of the Sikh community does not follow this particular aspect of religious teach-
ing. In a detailed study of the Jat community in Northern India to which most Sikhs
belong, Das Gupta (1987) points out the rigid and crass asymmetries between men
and women. At the time of the study, the parents of women were expected to give
gifts to their daughter and their in-laws as long as they are alive in addition to any
dowry paid. They receive nothing in exchange. This one-way transfer of resources
can be so extreme that they would be expected to pay even for the food they con-
sume at their daughters new home. Women can also not inherit property and are
generally excluded from participation in the public, civil and religious spheres.
Looking at scheduled castes, that is at Hindus belonging to the lowest caste,
it appears that anti-female bias is more of a high-caste phenomenon at least for
birth rates. Either scheduled castes do not have equal access to illegal abortions,
a plausible explanation given the generally low economic status of the scheduled
castes, or the traditional high-caste ideas of the appropriate female-male relationship
have not been adopted by the scheduled castes. Caste diﬀerences disappear when
children between zero and ﬁve years are concerned. Unless girls are more likely to
die than boys, an assumption not supported by the evidence (U.S. Census Bureau
2004), neglect of girls and diﬀerential access to healthcare reduces the sex-ratio
for scheduled caste households to the average level for non-scheduled-caste Hindus.
This suggests that the low caste and therefore poorer families have less access to
sex-selection technology but compensate for this after birth.
The importance of culture is reﬂected in the correlation between voting behavior
and the number of girls relative to boys that are born and survive. In accordance
with the observations that Muslims do not practice sex selection, we cannot reject
the hypothesis that a high vote share for the Muslim League has no eﬀect on sex
ratios. As the correlation between Muslim population and the election results of
the Muslim League is only 0.188, the statistical insigniﬁcance of the Muslim League
is not due to collinearities. The result then may be due to two reasons. Either, the
political program of the Muslim League is not particularly attractive to conservative
Muslims or conservative Islam does not translate to low sex ratios. In light of the
statistical insigniﬁcance of the Muslim population the second argument is certainly
plausible.
The coeﬃcient of the vote share for parties associated with the RSS is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at the 1% level and quite large. As we have argued above, one can
make the claim that the BJP and its allies have an implicitly male agenda and that
people with similar beliefs might therefore be more likely to vote for them. The
regression results bear out this claim at least to some extent and can be interpreted
as supporting the link between cultural factors and low sex ratios.
4.1 Robustness of Results
Looking closer at the geographic distribution of both the sex ratios (table 2) and
election results (table 5) one notices a distinct separation of India into two parts
with low sex ratios as well as the electoral success of religious Hindu parties being
concentrated in the North West of the country. In fact, this divide appears to
be along roughly the same lines as Lahiri & Self (2004, 2005)’s village endogamy
versus exogamy distinction. This, then, poses the question whether the statistical
link between son preference and the success of RSS-linked parties is caused by a
cultural tradition particular to the Northwest of India or whether other unobservable
variables underly both phenomena.
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along state lines.21 The division is somewhat arbitrary, but follows loosely the
language division between the Hindi-speaking North and West and the Southern and
Eastern states where local languages predominate. The exception is Maharashtra
which is included in the Western region even though it has its own local language.
We chose this division for two reasons. First, Maharashtra appears similar to the
other Northwestern states: sex-ratios are below average and the electoral success of
the Shiv Sena, a Maharashtran Hindu nationalist party, links it politically to the
region.22 Moreover, in contrast to Southern traditions, family structures tend to be
patrilocal. Secondly, by making sure that the states with below-average sex-ratios
are contained in the same regions, we maximize the probability that inter-regional
diﬀerences in behavior are picked up by the regional control variable. In other words,
we are deﬁning the regions in a way that maximizes the strength of the robustness
check.
Table 11 summarizes the results for the sex ratios at birth and the relative num-
ber of girls between ages zero and ﬁve. Both regional controls and political variables
are included.23 As expected, the controls of the regions with below-average sex ra-
tios (North and West) are signiﬁcant a the 1% level and large. Not surprisingly also
the coeﬃcient for the vote share of Hindu and Sikh religious parties has decreased.
Nevertheless, they are both still statistically signiﬁcant and relatively large. This
implies that even within the regions where son-preference is concentrated, districts
with a high proportion of religious votes exhibit lower sex ratios. A general North-
South cultural divide cannot account for all the variation in sex ratios.
As mentioned in section 3, the vote shares of the religious parties refer to state
assembly election results that immediately predate the 2001 household survey used
for the analysis. Since fertility decisions necessarily predate the actual observed sex
ratios, using past election data appears to reﬂect cultural attitudes at the time of
the decision more closely, if not for births observed in 2001 then at least for the sex
ratio of children under ﬁve. It can be argued, however, that past elections, through
the composition of the state assemblies, aﬀect unobservables such as access to health
services or vaccination programs. If religious parties are more likely to implement
anti-female health policies, this rather than culture may drive our result. A similar
connection can be made to lax enforcement of anti-sex-determination laws or, more
generally, legislation protecting female rights. While we believe that this is unlikely,
especially since the lag between the elections and our time reference does in no case
exceed four years and state-level healthcare provision and law enforcement proce-
dures are probably slow to change, we re-estimated the relevant regressions using
post-2001 election data. This does not materially alter our results and conclusions
(table 12).
Lastly, we examine a population growth equilibrium argument for low sex-ratios
(table 13).24 If the desired marriage age for females is lower than for men and
21The Northern region includes Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Haryana, Uttar
Pradesh, Uttaranchal, Delhi, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, and Chattisgarh; the Western region in-
cludes Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Goa; the Southern region consists of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka,
Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Pondicherry; the Eastern region includes Bihar, Jharkhand, West Bengal, and
Orissa; the Northeastern region consists of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram,
Nagaland, Sikkim, and Tripura.
22For a map of sex ratios, see ﬁgure 1.
23The omitted region is the Northeast.
24We use data from the Census of India, 1991, to calculate district-level population growth rates
between 1991 and 2001. By matching the districts in 2001 to those in 1991, we have data for 441
14marriage is required, high population growth implies that each wedding cohort
(consisting of older men and younger women) has an excess of women. In order
to achieve equilibrium in the marriage market, sex ratios in each birth cohort have
to be reduced. Since there might be some scope for arguing that a possible cor-
relation between voting behavior and fertility decisions exists, district population
growth rates were added to the original model speciﬁcation. While the results pro-
vide evidence that population growth has a signiﬁcant yet small impact on the ratio
of boys and girls under 5, birth rates are not aﬀected. Neither are the coeﬃcients
for the political variables.
5 Conclusions
The aim of this paper has been to provide a link between economic and cultural
causes for low sex ratios in India. We argue that culture enters parents’ deci-
sion to discriminate against girls in two ways. First, due to culturally determined
asymmetries in power and non-economic value between men and women, parental
preferences might be skewed towards boys. Even if this is not the case, economic
factors such as dowry payments and the inability of women to provide for their
parents in old age make daughters more costly than sons and convince parents to
engage in sex selection. These economic factors, we claim, are in turn inﬂuenced by
cultural aspects.
Support for this argument can be found in the regression results. Unless Mus-
lims actively discriminate against boys, a hypothesis for which there is no evidence,
no religious community apart from Muslims appears to be immune to the pressures
that lead to low sex ratios. The diﬀerence between Muslims and other religions is
telling in this respect. The economic framework in which households operate, such
as labor markets, the social security system or access to capital markets, should not
be diﬀerent for Muslims than all other religions. Cultural factors such as dowry pay-
ments, the relationship between in-laws and marriage patterns, on the other hand,
vary between religious communities. This strengthens the argument that cultural
aspects either by themselves or through economic incentives are instrumental in the
anti-female bias seen in many Indian regions.
The importance of culture in the prevalent anti-female bias poses additional
challenges for policy makers. Instead of relying on rising income and the availability
of better economic opportunities for women to lead to a more balanced sex ratio,
cultural obstacles have to be overcome. The negative eﬀect of higher median income
found in the empirical analysis makes this point quite forcefully: income growth
alone is not enough to remove the anti-female bias in India. Infact, rising income
provides opportunities for further discrimination against females. Thus, any policy
to reverse the trend of falling sex ratios has to change the relationship between men
and women.
Changing cultural norms and the framework in which men and women interact
is not a trivial task and one should not forget that gender equality is a relatively
new concept even in Europe and the US. Since as economists we can say very little
about social engineering and the sociology of gender relations we cannot outline a
comprehensive program to reduce anti-female bias in India. What seems clear is that
indoctrination will have to play a big part, be it in school or through government
sponsored programs. The role of TV and the cinema industry in the gender debate
should in our opinion not be underestimated. With a large part of the population
districts, since several districts split into two or more smaller geographical ones during the decade.
15having access to these types of media and given the impact of movies and soap-
operas on behavior and potentially cultural norms, a change in gender relations
shown in movies might in the end aﬀect cultural norms.
Such changes cannot occur over night, however, and more immediate measures
have to be contemplated. Strict enforcement of existing laws is part of this. Both
sex-selective abortion and dowry payments are illegal in India and it is the enforce-
ment of the relevant laws that appears to be lacking. A combination of enforcement
of existing laws and potentially new laws might be necessary to strengthen the power
of women. This ranges from tough sentences for rape or forced marriage to a strong
state reaction to allegations of spousal abuse. The message of the state has to be
that women are equal and as valuable to men and that violence against them will
not go unpunished.
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19Table 1: Females per 1000 Males Among Children Age 0-5 Years: India, 1961-2001
Year Gender Ratio
Total Rural Urban
1961 992 997 966
1971 979 983 960
1981 978 979 973
1991 955 959 943
2001 930 941 909
Source: Census of India, 2001.
20Table 2: Females per 1000 Males at Birth and Among Children Age 0-5 Years: Indian
States, 2001
State/Union Territory Region Child Ratio Birth Ratio
All India Rural Urban All India Rural Urban
Andhra Pradesh South 964 967 958 951 946 968
Arunachal Pradesh Northeast 975 971 994 997 991 1022
Assam Northeast 970 973 949 948 945 982
Bihar East 956 959 933 917 917 917
Chattisgarh North 972 983 939 928 931 913
Delhi North 870 854 871 852 828 855
Goa West 936 949 924 921 948 895
Gujarat West 879 911 840 834 848 802
Haryana North 816 821 806 786 785 790
Himachal Pradesh North 888 892 844 845 844 854
Jharkhand East 972 983 935 907 912 880
Jammu & Kashmir North 932 954 870 951 949 966
Karnataka South 947 950 942 936 931 948
Kerala South 961 963 957 969 971 962
Maharashtra West 913 914 912 877 871 889
Manipur Northeast 960 957 967 973 967 995
Meghalaya Northeast 975 977 965 958 957 965
Mizoram Northeast 975 979 971 994 978 1014
Madhya Pradesh North 935 945 911 903 906 888
Nagaland Northeast 978 986 945 984 988 963
Orissa East 958 962 938 928 925 953
Pondicherry South 972 970 973 989 984 992
Punjab North 795 793 797 787 786 791
Rajasthan North 911 918 892 864 869 841
Sikkim Northeast 951 955 906 937 933 982
Tamil Nadu South 948 937 960 935 919 960
Tripura Northeast 966 969 953 973 975 960
Uttar Pradesh North 925 936 890 901 899 914
Uttaranchal North 904 916 870 853 852 857
West Bengal East 963 968 954 976 968 1007
India 934 941 911 905 906 904
Source: Census of India, 2001.
21Table 3: Females per 1000 Male Births: International Comparison
Country Gender Ratio
All Europe 945
United Kingdom 946
Germany 944
France 952
Italy 945
Spain 942
North America 956
USA 952
Canada 963
Mexico 966
India 905
Source: Data for European countries is from the World
Health Organization (WHO), 1950-1999; Data for North
America and Mexico is from WHO, 1958-1997; Data for
India is from the Census of India, 2001.
22Table 4: The Cost of Abortion (in Rupees) in India
State Sector Duration of Pregnancy Study
Under 12 Weeks Over 20 Weeks
Kerala Private 1,266 5,000 M. Ramanathan et al. (2003)
Public Free Free
Haryana Private 300 3,000 S. Barge et al. (2003)
Public 9 80
Madhya Pradesh Private 389 1583 A. George (2003)
Public 209 775
Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, Private 394 649 Center for Operations Research
Gujarat, Tamil Nadu and Trainng (1997)
Public 135 534
Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan Private 700 800 Parivar Seva Sanstha (2002)
Public 200 500
23Table 5: Electoral Votes for Religious Parties: Indian States, pre-2001
State/Union Territory Region Share of Votes Won By
BJP BJP SAD MUL
Allies
Andhra Pradesh South 3.67 0.01 0.00 0.00
Arunachal Pradesh Northeast 10.83 0.00 0.00 0.00
Assam Northeast 10.41 0.03 0.00 0.00
Bihar East 11.74 10.13 0.00 0.00
Chattisgarh North 39.85 0.22 0.00 0.00
Delhi North 34.02 1.68 0.03 0.00
Goa West 26.15 15.08 0.00 0.00
Gujarat West 44.79 0.06 0.00 0.00
Haryana North 8.94 29.61 0.00 0.00
Himachal Pradesh North 39.01 0.11 0.00 0.00
Jharkhand East 25.12 4.28 0.00 0.00
Jammu & Kashmir North 12.13 0.00 0.00 0.00
Karnataka South 20.68 13.52 0.00 0.00
Kerala South 5.48 0.49 0.00 7.19
Maharashtra West 14.53 17.38 0.00 0.00
Manipur Northeast 12.14 8.72 0.00 0.00
Meghalaya Northeast 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mizoram Northeast 2.50 0.28 0.00 0.00
Madhya Pradesh North 39.06 0.44 0.00 0.00
Nagaland Northeast 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Orissa East 18.19 29.55 0.00 0.00
Pondicherry South 1.13 0.00 0.00 0.00
Punjab North 8.33 0.04 40.74 0.00
Rajasthan North 33.22 0.85 0.00 0.00
Sikkim Northeast 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tamil Nadu South 1.81 0.02 0.00 0.00
Tripura Northeast 5.87 0.00 0.00 0.00
Uttar Pradesh North 32.06 0.57 0.00 0.00
Uttaranchal North 40.87 0.00 0.00 0.00
West Bengal East 6.47 0.11 0.00 0.05
Source: Electoral Votes in State Legislative Assemblies, Election Commission
of India, pre-2001.
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25Table 7: Description of Dependent & Explanatory Variables
Variable Description
Dependent
LNFMR05 Natural log of the female-male ratio among zero to ﬁve year olds
LNFMBR Natural log of the female-male birth ratio
Explanatory
Hindu Votes Share of votes won by BJP and Allies (BJD, INL, JD(U), MAG, SAP, and SHS)
Muslim Votes Share of votes won by MUL
Muslims Proportion of Muslims
Christians Proportion of Christians
Sikhs Proportion of Sikhs
Buddhists Proportion of Buddhists
Jains Proportion of Jains
Male Voters Proportion of male voters
Female Voters Proportion of female voters
Literate Males Proportion of literate adult males
Literate Females Proportion of literate adult females
Male Workers Proportion of adult male workers
Female Workers Proportion of adult female workers
Male Cultivators Proportion of adult male cultivators
Female Cultivators Proportion of adult female cultivators
Male Agr Laborers Proportion of adult male agricultural laborers
Female Agr Laborers Proportion of adult female agricultural laborers
Urban Proportion of population living in urban areas
Scheduled Castes Proportion of scheduled castes
Scheduled Tribes Proportion of scheduled tribes
Income Natural log of median monthly per capita household expenditure
Income 5 Natural log of 5th percentile of monthly per capita household expenditure
Income 25 Natural log of 25th percentile of monthly per capita household expenditure
Income 50 Natural log of 50th percentile (median) of monthly per capita household expenditure
Income 75 Natural log of 75th percentile of monthly per capita household expenditure
Income 95 Natural log of 95th percentile of monthly per capita household expenditure
North 1 if district is in Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Haryana, Uttar
Pradesh, Uttaranchal, Delhi, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, or Chattisgarh; 0 otherwise
West 1 if district is in Gujarat, Maharshtra, or Goa; 0 otherwise
South 1 if district is in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, or Pondicherry;
0 otherwise
East 1 if district is in Bihar, Jharkhand, West Bengal, or Orissa; 0 otherwise
Northeast 1 if district is in Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland,
Sikkim, or Tripura, 0 otherwise
Workers include both main and marginal workers. Main workers are those who worked 6 months or more during the year.
Marginal workers are those who worked less than 6 months during the year. Cultivators include individuals who are engaged in
cultivation of land owned, held from the Government, or held from private persons or institutions for payment in money, kind
or share. Agricultural laborers are those who work on another person’s land for wages in money or kind or share.
26Table 8: OLS Regression Results Without Regional Dummies: Female-Male Child Ra-
tios, Indian Districts, 2001
Variable Dependent Variable
LNFMR05 LNFMR05
Coeﬃcient Standard Coeﬃcient Standard
Error Error
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hindu Votes -0.0739 0.0124***
Muslim Votes 0.0348 0.0591
Male Voters 0.0369 0.0291 0.0412 0.0283
Female Voters -0.0502 0.0254** -0.0757 0.0260***
Literate Males -0.1163 0.0496** -0.0810 0.0487*
Literate Females 0.0728 0.0431* 0.0585 0.0422
Male Workers 0.1479 0.0523*** 0.1291 0.0522**
Female Workers 0.0338 0.0243 0.0192 0.0244
Male Cultivators -0.0573 0.0231** -0.0319 0.0231
Female Cultivators -0.0175 0.0211 -0.0226 0.0202
Male Agr Laborers -0.0846 0.0317*** -0.0912 0.0308***
Female Agr Laborers 0.0544 0.0202*** 0.0589 0.0192***
Urban -0.0108 0.0153 -0.0136 0.0151
Scheduled Castes 0.0182 0.0255 0.0091 0.0249
Scheduled Tribes 0.0611 0.0123*** 0.0664 0.0121***
Muslims 0.0770 0.0148*** 0.0574 0.0142***
Christians 0.0329 0.0134** 0.0049 0.0129
Sikhs -0.2194 0.0194*** -0.2361 0.0186***
Buddhists 0.0143 0.0204 0.0024 0.0195
Jains -0.8670 0.3220*** -0.4796 0.3720
Income -0.0381 0.0058*** -0.0357 0.0055***
Constant 0.0876 0.0329*** 0.1026 0.0316***
Observations 569 569
R Square 0.6016 0.6291
Source: Census of India, 2001. Robust standard errors are reported in columns (2), and
(4). *** Signiﬁcant at 1%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, * signiﬁcant at 10%.
27Table 9: OLS Regression Results Without Regional Dummies: Female-Male Birth Ra-
tios, Indian Districts, 2001
Variable Dependent Variable
LNFMBR LNFMBR
Coeﬃcient Standard Coeﬃcient Standard
Error Error
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hindu Votes -0.1265 0.0162***
Muslim Votes 0.0097 0.0533
Male Voters -0.0711 0.0457 -0.0632 0.0430
Female Voters 0.0630 0.0405 0.0190 0.0399
Literate Males -0.1656 0.0806** -0.1076 0.0783
Literate Females 0.1084 0.0666 0.0878 0.0663
Male Workers 0.2210 0.0877** 0.1853 0.0858**
Female Workers 0.0058 0.0349 -0.0184 0.0343
Male Cultivators -0.0659 0.0361* -0.0235 0.0360
Female Cultivators -0.0593 0.0288** -0.0685 0.0270**
Male Agr Laborers -0.1056 0.0497** -0.1195 0.0490**
Female Agr Laborers 0.0198 0.0292 0.0289 0.0280
Urban 0.0169 0.0337 0.0103 0.0329
Scheduled Castes 0.0907 0.0448** 0.0753 0.0427*
Scheduled Tribes 0.0951 0.0195*** 0.1047 0.0184***
Muslims 0.0999 0.0239*** 0.0679 0.0220***
Christians 0.0578 0.0213*** 0.0093 0.0218
Sikhs -0.2523 0.0263*** -0.2809 0.0248***
Buddhists 0.0412 0.0334 0.0208 0.0319
Jains -1.5232 0.4277*** -0.8575 0.4413*
Income -0.0388 0.0089*** -0.0347 0.0083***
Constant 0.0629 0.0569 0.0900 0.0547
Observations 569 569
R Square 0.4655 0.5154
Source: Census of India, 2001. Robust standard errors are reported in columns (2), and
(4). *** Signiﬁcant at 1%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, * signiﬁcant at 10%.
28Figure 2: Quantile Regression Coeﬃcient: Child Sex Ratio
29Table 10: OLS Regression Results: Income Distribution Measures, Indian Districts,
2001
Variable Dependent Variable
LNFMR05 LNFMBR
Coeﬃcient Standard Coeﬃcient Standard
Error Error
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hindu Votes -0.0739 0.0125*** -0.1245 0.0162***
Muslim Votes 0.0294 0.0627 0.0020 0.0574
Male Voters 0.0408 0.0278 -0.0658 0.0425
Female Voters -0.0767 0.0259*** 0.0161 0.0396
Literate Males -0.0925 0.0504* -0.1347 0.0792*
Literate Females 0.0702 0.0441 0.1158 0.0661*
Male Workers 0.1206 0.0526** 0.1722 0.0840**
Female Workers 0.0251 0.0246 -0.0032 0.0338
Male Cultivators -0.0285 0.0233 -0.0168 0.0352
Female Cultivators -0.0239 0.0202 -0.0736 0.0265***
Male Agr Laborers -0.0964 0.0311*** -0.1375 0.0490***
Female Agr Laborers 0.0590 0.0193*** 0.0321 0.0280
Urban -0.0150 0.0152 0.0057 0.0323
Scheduled Castes 0.0076 0.0250 0.0774 0.0425*
Scheduled Tribes 0.0611 0.0128*** 0.0943 0.0187***
Muslims 0.0608 0.0149*** 0.0768 0.0226***
Christians 0.0070 0.0139 0.0141 0.0230
Sikhs -0.2322 0.0188*** -0.2702 0.0249***
Buddhists 0.0012 0.0186 0.0188 0.0297
Jains -0.4021 0.3825 -0.6312 0.4609
Income 5 -0.0214 0.0100** -0.0528 0.0187***
Income 25 0.0177 0.0201 0.0234 0.0330
Income 50 -0.0397 0.0216* 0.0032 0.0338
Income 75 0.0094 0.0166 -0.0117 0.0262
Income 95 -0.0060 0.0086 -0.0082 0.0127
Constant 0.1206 0.0370*** 0.1342 0.0561**
Observations 569 569
R Square 0.6327 0.5302
Source: Census of India, 2001. Robust standard errors are reported in columns (2) and
(4). *** Signiﬁcant at 1%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, * signiﬁcant at 10%.
30Table 11: OLS Regression Results With Regional Dummies: Female-Male Child and
Birth Ratios, Indian Districts, 2001
Variable Dependent Variable
LNFMR05 LNFMBR
Coeﬃcient Standard Coeﬃcient Standard
Error Error
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hindu Votes -0.0334 0.0122*** -0.0666 0.0174***
Muslim Votes -0.0318 0.0549 -0.0809 0.0561
Male Voters 0.0240 0.0292 -0.0822 0.0423*
Female Voters -0.0744 0.0275*** 0.0150 0.0412
Literate Males -0.0234 0.0483 -0.0201 0.0747
Literate Females 0.0419 0.0428 0.0582 0.0661
Male Workers 0.0410 0.0515 0.0714 0.0907
Female Workers 0.0294 0.0237 -0.0076 0.0342
Male Cultivators 0.0041 0.0228 0.0207 0.0356
Female Cultivators -0.0107 0.0180 -0.0506 0.0240**
Male Agr Laborers -0.0297 0.0356 -0.0224 0.0575
Female Agr Laborers 0.0444 0.0207** 0.0056 0.0302
Urban -0.0021 0.0148 0.0264 0.0335
Scheduled Castes -0.0120 0.0274 0.0471 0.0498
Scheduled Tribes 0.0709 0.0127*** 0.1117 0.0192***
Muslims 0.0766 0.0141*** 0.0941 0.0226***
Christians -0.0226 0.0140 -0.0290 0.0232
Sikhs -0.1926 0.0185*** -0.2200 0.0249***
Buddhists 0.0261 0.0268 0.0510 0.0425
Jains 0.0051 0.3586 -0.1839 0.3929
Income -0.0261 0.0056*** -0.0222 0.0092**
North -0.0283 0.0082*** -0.0420 0.0139***
South 0.0078 0.0073 0.0082 0.0148
East -0.0049 0.0074 -0.0142 0.0136
West -0.0460 0.0086*** -0.0694 0.0144***
Constant 0.0585 0.0322* 0.0307 0.0564
Observations 569 569
R Square 0.6687 0.5651
Source: Census of India, 2001. Robust standard errors are reported in columns (2) and
(4). *** Signiﬁcant at 1%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, * signiﬁcant at 10%. The omitted
regional category is the Northeast.
31Table 12: OLS Regression Results: Post-2001 Electoral Data, Indian Districts, 2001
Variable Dependent Variable
LNFMR05 LNFMBR
Coeﬃcient Standard Coeﬃcient Standard
Error Error
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hindu Votes - Post -0.0724 0.0132*** -0.1234 0.0194***
Muslim Votes - Post 0.0378 0.0589 0.0144 0.0554
Male Voters - Post 0.0329 0.0282 -0.0775 0.0428*
Female Voters - Post -0.0618 0.0253** 0.0429 0.0405
Literate Males -0.0480 0.0502 -0.0518 0.0812
Literate Females 0.0341 0.0431 0.0465 0.0665
Male Workers 0.1493 0.0501*** 0.2198 0.0824***
Female Workers 0.0253 0.0238 -0.0081 0.0330
Male Cultivators -0.0340 0.0225 -0.0272 0.0348
Female Cultivators -0.0240 0.0195 -0.0709 0.0260***
Male Agr Laborers -0.0940 0.0313*** -0.1243 0.0506**
Female Agr Laborers 0.0599 0.0192*** 0.0306 0.0274
Urban -0.0140 0.0163 0.0097 0.0365
Scheduled Castes 0.0000 0.0244 0.0598 0.0425
Scheduled Tribes 0.0727 0.0122*** 0.1154 0.0186***
Muslims 0.0622 0.0144*** 0.0763 0.0217***
Christians 0.0080 0.0131 0.0148 0.0215
Sikhs -0.2287 0.0185*** -0.2683 0.0243***
Buddhists -0.0099 0.0199 -0.0001 0.0326
Jains -0.3216 0.4039 -0.5912 0.5091
Income -0.0354 0.0054*** -0.0341 0.0081***
Constant 0.0755 0.0319** 0.0436 0.0538
Observations 569 569
R Square 0.63 0.5165
Source: Census of India, 2001. Robust standard errors are reported in columns (2) and
(4). *** Signiﬁcant at 1%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, * signiﬁcant at 10%.
32Table 13: OLS Regression Results: Including Population Growth Rates, Indian Districts,
2001
Variable Dependent Variable
LNFMR05 LNFMBR
Coeﬃcient Standard Coeﬃcient Standard
Error Error
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hindu Votes -0.0855 0.0158*** -0.1360 0.0201***
Muslim Votes 0.0235 0.0593 0.0557 0.0661
Male Voters 0.0593 0.0339* -0.0300 0.0494
Female Voters -0.1105 0.0326*** -0.0280 0.0492
Literate Males -0.1009 0.0606* -0.1976 0.0976**
Literate Females 0.0601 0.0498 0.1336 0.0776*
Male Workers 0.1236 0.0584** 0.1550 0.0944
Female Workers 0.0249 0.0277 -0.0113 0.0410
Male Cultivators -0.0484 0.0269* -0.0348 0.0425
Female Cultivators -0.0114 0.0234 -0.0745 0.0317**
Male Agr Laborers -0.0872 0.0371** -0.0925 0.0564
Female Agr Laborers 0.0506 0.0235** 0.0013 0.0315
Urban -0.0024 0.0173 0.0264 0.0418
Scheduled Castes 0.0360 0.0262 0.1304 0.0461***
Scheduled Tribes 0.0693 0.0134*** 0.1047 0.0203***
Muslims 0.0670 0.0218*** 0.0300 0.0349
Christians 0.0090 0.0150 0.0145 0.0256
Sikhs -0.2525 0.0226*** -0.3249 0.0319***
Buddhists 0.0149 0.0224 0.0503 0.0356
Jains -0.5684 0.4352 -0.6693 0.4965
Income -0.0350 0.0066*** -0.0338 0.0099***
Pop Growth Rate -0.0004 0.0001*** -0.0003 0.0002
Constant 0.1279 0.0400*** 0.1534 0.0709**
Observations 441 441
R Square 0.6234 0.5271
Source: Census of India, 2001. Robust standard errors are reported in columns (2) and
(4). *** Signiﬁcant at 1%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, * signiﬁcant at 10%.
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